Actus Reus – Paper

ACTUS REUS OMISSION & CAUSATION The cosmopolitan dry land for imposing obligation in iniquitous impartialityis that the defendant must(prenominal) be developd to wealthy someone committed a discredited answer whilst having had a guilty realm of mind. The physical elements argon conjointly c each(prenominal)ed the turningus reus and the accompanied mental state is called the mens rea. It is the fundamental calling of the prosecution to prove both of these elements of the offence to the satisf defendion of the judge or jury beyond reasonable query. In the absence of such(prenominal) proof the defendant give be acquitted.ACTUS REUS An actus reus consists of more than just an act. It also consists of whatever pile and consequences ar recognised for liability for the offence in question in a nonher(prenominal) words all the elements of an offence other than the mental element. The margin actus reus has been given a a lot wider meaning by Glanville Williams in his wretched practice of lawfulness. He says When he use the technical tern actus reus we include all the external circumstances and consequences specified in the rule of law as constituting the forbidden situation.Reus must be taken as indicating the situation specified in the actus reus as on that, given any necessary mental element, is forbidden by law. In other words, acus reus means the whole definition of the crime with the excommunication of the mental element and it even includes a mental element in so far as that is contained in the definition of an act. Actus reus includes negative as well as positive elements. For example, as stared earlier, the actus reus of murder is the make of decease of a person.It also includes circumstances, such as the person whose expiration has been sufficed was non as a consequence of a sentence or expiration given to him or that the close was caused within the territorial jurisdiction of the state. OMISSIONS IN CRIMES Omissions are co ntroversial for two main reasons_ first, whether and to what extent it is justifiable omissions earlier than acts and secondly, whether liability for omissions rather than act urgency in distressing law. pursue the second transmit here, much has been make above of the importance f requiring proof that the defendant voluntarily did some social occasion to produce prohibited preserve or consequence. In so far as this tramp be termed an act requirement, are omissions a true exception to it? If they are, is this other line of merchandise against unlawfulizing them? One much-discussed preliminary question is the tubercle between acts and omissions. Sometimes it is argued that certain(p) verbs imply action and therefore throw out liability for omissions, and that the criminal law should respect. The distinctions flowing from this. English speak tos have often used this linguistic or interpretive approach.It has led to a variety of decisions in different statutes, without muc h discussion of the general principles chthonianlying omissions liability. The law commissions considerably draft criminal fool arounde may be said to signal the continuation of this approach, by redefining the homicide offences in terms of causing death rather than killing, and purification the price offences in terms of causing damage, rather than alter, so as to leave to the full open the administrations the possibility of so constructing the relevant (statutory) provisions as to impose liability for omissions.The draft cod would therefore remove any linguistic awkwardness in saying, for example, that a parent killed a child by failing to feed it nevertheless it does so in this specific instance, and without proclaiming a general principle, that the act requirement may be fulfilled by an omission of a craft can be established. Attachment to the vagaries of the language is no proper basis for delineating the boundaries of criminal liability.In some situations the courts, following the linguistic approach, have nevertheless ready themselves able to impose omissions liability. In Speck (1977)3 the defendant was charged with committing an act of gross indecency with or towards a child. The evidence was that an 8 yr old girl placed her hand on his trousers over his penis. he allowed that hand to remain there for some minutes, causing him to have an erection.The court of appeal held that the defendants failure to remove the hand amounted to an invitation to the child with the act, or it created a duty in an adult to put an end to the innocent tactile sensation of this kind, with omissions liability for not fulfilling the duty. The analysis is similar to that in miller (1983) where D fell asleep whilst smoking, woke up to find the mattress smouldering, provided simply leftfield the room and went to sleep elsewhere. He was convicted of causing criminal damage by fire, on the basis that a person who initiates a sequence of events nnocently and because fails to do anything to stop the sequence should be wishinged as having caused the whole sequence. On this view the conduct constitutes a single, continuing act Miller caused the damage because he alsok no steps to extinguish the fire he had innocently started. It must be doubted whether these efforts to find an act which wherefore coincides in point in point of time with defendants knowl process and intentions are convincing. surely the courts are imposing liability for an omission on these cases, by recognizing that a duty arises.Speck is a little different from miller since the original act of the subatomic particle was of the girl, and the duty must therefore amount the recognition of an obligation on an adult to put an end to the indecent yet innocent jot by a child. In so far as these decisions start to extend the statutory wording, are they objectionable on grounds of retroactivity and wishing of fair warning, or defensible as performances of existing common law doctr ine to new situations?In other situations it seems possible to offer plausible reasons for regarding the same event as either an act or an omission, and in some cases the courts have sought to exploit this ambiguity when stooling with subtle medical examination issues. Yet it is one thing to say that a health care professional who decides not to replace an empty bag for a drip-feed has made an omission, whereas switching a ventilator off is an act is another thing to maintain that the act-omission distinction should be crucial to any determination of the criminal liability in the two situations.In Airedale NHS trust v bland (1993)the domicile of lords held that it would be lawful for a debase to withdraw interference from a patient in a persistent vegetative state, even though death would inevitable be hastened by that conduct. The house held that the withdrawal of treatment would constitute and omission, and thus regarded the duties of the doctor as the central issue. The dec ision was that the doctor a doctor has no duty to continue lookspan preparation treatment when it is no longer in the best interest of the patient, having regard to responsible medical opinion. even the court of appeal declined to adopt this subterfuge in Re A(conjoined match Surgical separation), holding that the surgical separation of the twins would undoubtedly an act, and subsequently deciding that carrying out an operation which would entrust in the death of one twin in order to save the life story of other could be justifies on the grounds of necessity. This demonstration of the fragility of the act-omission distinction of the vagaries fthe English language indicates that it may be simplistic to oppose omissions liability in the principle. in that respect are some clear cases of omission in which it is wanted to have criminal liability, such as the parent who neglects to feed her or his child or neglects to protect it from abuse. Omissions can be involuntary or not, in t he same way as acts and provided, that the harm burdened because D failed to intervene, it can be argued that omissions are also causes. Omissions liability ay therefore satisfy the principles that no one should be held liable for bodily movements that he or she did not or could not comport.It may also satisfy the principle that no person should be held liable for the conduct or consequences that he or she did not cause. But one point of the act requirement is to exclude liability for mere thoughts that do not result in some bodily movement, and omissions fall foul to that. They do so for a best reason that certain positive duties to act are so main(prenominal) that they can rightly be made the subject of criminal liability. Of course, such a duty should also be defined with sufficient evidence and made known to those affected by it.So long as these courtly requirements are fulfilled there can be no equity objection to holding a person liable, provided that he or she is ade quate of taking some steps to carry out the duty. CAUSATION IN CRIMES An event is really often the result of a number of federal agents. A factor is said to have caused a particular event if, without that factor or, the event would not have happened. Thus, a man is said to have caused the actus reus of a crime, if, that actus would not have occurred without his participation in what was through. Some quotidian relationships has to be established between his conduct and the prohibited result.A man is ordinarily held criminally liable only for the consequences of his conduct as he foresaw, (or is crimes of negligence, he ought to have foreseen). The act must be the event causans, ie, the immediate or proximate cause of the effect. When the facts are direct and simple, then establishing the causal liaison between the act and the effect may not be hard-fought, as for instance in a case of person shooting another person and thereby killing him. The creator can also be without any direct physical act. if the victim asks his way on a dark night nd the charge with the intention of causing his death, directs him to a path that he knows will bring him to a cliff edge , and the victing suffers a fatal fall, this is clearly murder, though the accused has done nada more than utter words. This can be true in cases of abetment, exhortation and conspiracy. In the instances express above, it is not difficult to establish the direct result between the cause and the effect. The difficulty arises only in cases of multiple causation, where it is difficult to establish the imputability. Example A, intending to kill B but only aches him very slightly.A clearly has the requisite mens rea for murder, that is, he foresees and desires Bs death. Not let us assume that on his being ta ken to the hospital in an ambulance, a piece of masonry from a building falls on the ambulance and kills B or, alternatively, that B has a rare crease disease which prevents his blood from coa gulation so that the slight wound leans to his death, which it would not have done if he had not been suffering from this disease or, alternatively, that B refuses to have the wound treated and dies of blood poisoning, which would not have occurred if B had had the wounded treated.In all these cases, a problem of causation arises, i. e. , did A cause Bs death for the purposes of the criminal law so that he can be convicted of murder? If the result is too remote and accidental in its occurrence, then there is no criminal liability. CAUSATION AND NEGLIGENCE The difficulty of causation arises very often n cases of negligence. It has t be established that first, the conduct of the person was delinquent and secondly, that but for the negligent act of accused, the accident would not have occurred. In other words, the actus reus should be causally connected to the act, which should be proved to be a negligent.In order to impose criminal liability under S 304A, IPC, it is essential to est ablish that death is the direct result of the rash or (and) negligent act of the accused. It must be causa causans the immediate cause and not enough that it may be quasa sine qua non, ie, proximate cause. There can be no conviction when presumption or negligence of third party intervenes. In Suleman rahiman mulani v state of Maharashtra the Supreme Court has approved his rule. In Suleman rahiman mulani the accused who was driving the jeep struck the deceased, as a result of which he sustained dependable injuries. The ccused put the injured person in the jeep for medical treatment, but he died. Thereafter, the accused cremated the body. The accused was charged under s304A and 201 of the IPC. As per s 304A, there must be direct nexus between the death of a person and rash and negligent act of the accused that caused the death of the deceased. It was the case of the prosecution of the accused had possessed only a scholarly persons indorse and hence was guilty of causing the dea th of the deceased. The court held that there was no presumption in law that a person who possesses only a learners license or possesses no license at all, does not know driving.A person could for heterogeneous reasons, including stainless indifference, might not have been taken a regular license . there was evidence to show that the accused had driven the jeep to various places on the previous day of occurrence. So before the accused convicted under s304A, there must a proof that the accused drove in a rash and negligent manner and death was a direct consequence of such rash and negligent manner. In the absence of such evidence no offence under s 304A was made out. The accused was acquitted of the charges. MINIMAL CAUSATIONWhen death of a person is caused after medical treatment, it cannot be said that the treatment was not proper or inadequate, or had better treatment been given, the death would not have taken place. This is because, the incumbrance of the doctor is in the natu re of minimum causation and hence its handling would have played only a minor part, if any, in causing death. As far as the IPC is concerned, explanation 2 of s 299 specifically states that if an act causes death, even death could have been avoided by proper remedies and in force(p) treatment, the act shall be deemed to have caused death and the person will be criminally liable.If death results from an injury voluntarily caused, the person who causes the injury, therefore, is deemed to have caused the death, although the life of victim might have been saved if proper medical treatment, provided that it was administered in good faith by a competent physician or surgeon. In Moti singh v state of uttar Pradesh the deceased gayacharan had received two gunshot wounds in the abdomen which were dangerous to life. The injury was received on February 1960. There was no evidence when he was discharged from the hospital and whether he had fully recovered or not.He, however, died on march 1 1 960. His body was cremated without berth mortem being done. The supreme court held that the two gunshot injuries were dangerous to life were not sufficient for holding that gyancharans death, which took place about one-third weeks after the incident, was on account of the injuries received by him. The court observed that in order to prove the charges on gyancharans murder, it was necessary to establish that he had died on account of injuries received on him.Since, the was no evidence to establish the cause of death, the accused could not be said to have caused the death of gyancharan. A crucial aspect highlighted by the court in the case was that the federation between the primary cause and the death should not be too remote. CONCLUSION Causation is a complex topic, with which we have been able to deal only brief here. Proof of causation is often said to be an essential precondition of criminal liability, but there is reason to doubt the generality of that requirement, notably in respect of accomplice liability and vicarious criminal liability.Rather than insisting on a universal requirement of causation, it may be preferable to argue that liability should be negatived, in general, by the voluntary intervening act of another. Several criticisms of the judicial approach to three exceptional categories of case hace been advanced above. Often the explanations given by the courts are unconvincing. Whilst the traditional or standard causal theory emphasizes the significance of the at last voluntary act, there is no reluctance to took wider or to massage the term voluntary in certain situations, especially where D clearly stated that the sequence of events by doing a wrongful act.The challenge is to re-examine the intuitions that lead judges and others to their conclusions (the wrongful act theory, the approach to medical mistakes etc. ) with a view to constructing a law that ensures that the courts respect the various principles . BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. P. S. A. Pilla i Criminal law 2. Glanville Williams book on criminal law 3. www. lawteacher. com 1 . Page 427, principles of criminal law, Glanville williams 2 . Duff, criminal attempts, 317-20 Glanville Williams 3 . 65 CR App R 161. 4 . (1983) 2 AC 161 5 . Criticisms by jc smith (1982) Crim LR 527 and 724, and D.Husak, philosophy of criminal law(1987), 176-8 6 . See I. M Kennedy, Treat me right (1988) 169-74 7 . (1993) AC 789 8 . 4 ALL ER 961 9 . Emery (1993) 14 Cr App R (s) 394, aand the new duty by the domestic violence, crime and victims act 2004. 10 . Glanville Williams, criminal law- causation) 11 . Rustom sherior Irani v state of Maharashtra(1969) ACC Cj 79 (SC) 12 . Md rangawalla v state of mahaarashtra AIR 1965 13 . However a driver is expected to anticipate reasonably foreseeable negligent act to road users as contributory negligence has no application in criminal law. 14 . Re san pai (1936) 14 rang 643